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INTRODUCTION

When seventy-two-year-old Clifford Mecham, Jr. hired a
technician to repair his Hewlett Packard desktop computer, he had
no idea it would lead to his undoing.1 After the technician found
some suspicious items on the computer, he immediately alerted the
Corpus Christi Police Department and a lawful search warrant
uncovered 31,562 pornographic images and 1,741 pornographic
videos that Mecham “had created himself.”2 The files depicted male
and female adult film entertainers engaging in sexually explicit acts
that Mecham edited to superimpose3 his own face onto the bodies of
the male actors.4 Horrifically, those were not the only modifications
Mecham made; the bodies of the female actors were superimposed
with the faces of his granddaughters, aged four, five, ten, and
sixteen.5
The Supreme Court has designated the act of superimposing
children’s faces onto videos of adults engaging in sexually explicit
acts as “morphed” child pornography.6 Essentially, morphed child
pornography lies at the intersection of “real” child pornography,
which the First Amendment does not protect,7 and “virtual” child
* Ella Smith, Juris Doctor Candidate, UIC Law School. Thank you to my
parents, for supporting me along the way. Thank you especially to my mom, for
being such a strong female role model in the legal world. Thank you David for
always believing in me throughout my law school journey. Lastly, thank you
Brighid for being my biggest cheerleader since I was born.
1. Scott H. Greenfield, Leaving Dysfunction to Others, SIMPLE JUST. (Feb.
15, 2020), www.blog.simplejustice.us/2020/02/15/leaving-dysfunction-to-others/
[perma.cc/2FPD-QKJY].
2. Septuagenarian Heads to Prison for Possessing Over 30K Images of
“Morphed” Child Pornography, U.S. ATTY’S OFF. S. DIST. TEX., (Apr. 8, 2019),
www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/septuagenarian-heads-prison-possessing-over30k-images-morphed-child-pornography [perma.cc/9EJL-Y2RC].
3. Superimpose, DICTIONARY.COM,
www.dictionary.reference.com/browse/superimpose [perma.cc/P2WY-VMLL]
(last visited Oct. 15, 2021) (“[T]o print (an image) over another image so that
both are seen at once.”).
4. United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
5. Id. at 260.
6. Caleb Beacham, Metamorphosis: Changing Oklahoma Law to Protect
Children from Morphed Child Pornography, 55 TULSA L. REV. 311, 316, n.47
(2020) (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002); United
States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 829–30 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bach,
400 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2005)). Other labels for morphed child pornography
include “rendered” or “spliced” child pornography. Beacham, supra, at 316
(citing ALISDAIR A. GILLESPIE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN INTERNET CRIME 100
(2003)). Others refer to this type of pornography as “pseudo-images.” Beacham,
supra, at 316 (citing SUZANNE OST, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL
GROOMING: LEGAL AND SOCIETAL RESPONSES 124 (2009)).
7. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 263.
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pornography, which is protected.8 Virtual child pornography has
been likened to “fictitious child pornography.”9 This is because it is
either entirely computer-generated or depicts adults that look like
minors.10 On the other hand, morphed child pornography “is created
when an innocent photo of an actual child is edited to make it
appear as though the child is engaging in a sexual act.”11 The
critical distinction is the “use of an actual child.”12 Thus, unlike
virtual pornography, morphed child pornography “uses an image of
a real child,” but like virtual pornography, “no child actually
engaged in sexually explicit conduct” in the making of morphed
child pornography.13 While there are multiple ways morphed child
pornography can be created, from using “rudimentary scissors and
glue to sophisticated computer editing programs,”14 strangely,
there are not many ways to protect children from being used in it.15
On November 28, 2018, Mecham was indicted with one count
of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B),16 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
8. Id. at 260; see Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 239-40 (defining virtual child
pornography as sexually explicit images “created by using adults who look like
minors or by using computer imaging.”).
9. Chelsea McLean, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography
Legislation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 224 (2007).
10. Beacham, supra note 6, at 316 (citing Gillespie, supra note 6, at 100).
11. Beacham, supra note 6, at 316 (citing MONIQUE MATTEI FERRARO &
EOGHAN CASEY, INVESTIGATING CHILD EXPLOITATION AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE
INTERNET, THE LAW AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 237 (2005)).
12. Beacham, supra note 6, at 316.
13. Mecham, 950 at 260.
14. Beacham, supra note 6, at 316 (citing FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 11,
at 237).
15. Beacham, supra note 6, at 316 (citing FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 11,
at 237). Images of children can be taken from almost anywhere; there is not
much stopping someone from editing photos of real children to make it appear
that they are engaged in sexual activity. Id. In order to stop child pornography,
for example, Maine has implemented classes for parents in sexual assault
support centers. What We Do and Don’t Know About Child Pornography – And
How
to
Stop
it,
BANGOR
DAILY
NEWS
(Dec.
23,
2015),
www.bangordailynews.com/2015/12/23/health/what-we-do-and-dont-knowabout-child-pornography-and-how-to-stop-it/ [perma.cc/DX4X-TLZL]. These
classes give parents tools to teach their children about sexual safety. Id.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2018). That statute states that any person
who:
Knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any
book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any
other material that contains an image of child pornography that has
been mailed, or shipped or transported using any means or facility of
interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by computer, or that was produced
using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer[.]
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of Texas.17 Mecham soon filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on
the grounds that, first, “the images found on his electronic devices
[were] not child pornography and therefore protected speech under
the First Amendment,” and, second, “the images created by photoshopping a child’s head on the body of an adult engaged in a sex act
[did] not implicate the compelling interests identified in [Supreme
Court precedent], making any definition that reaches such an image
unconstitutional as applied.”18 The district court ultimately denied
Mecham’s motion,19 and the case proceeded to a stipulated bench
trial where Mecham was found guilty.20 The district court
ultimately sentenced him to ninety-seven months’ imprisonment,21
and Mecham timely appealed to the Fifth Circuit.22 The outcome,
however, was anything but certain considering the stark circuit
split as to whether the First Amendment protects morphed child
pornography.23
In examining how this circuit split evolved and why its impact
is so critical, this Note proceeds in three parts. Part II details the
history of child pornography laws and explores the conflict between
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mecham24 and the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Anderson.25 Part III
breaks down the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ reasonings and uncovers
how their respective holdings directly impact child pornography
laws. Finally, Part IV scrutinizes the Eighth Circuit’s decision and
underscores the need to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s well-reasoned
understanding that morphed child pornography cannot be granted
First Amendment protection because “child pornography is a root
from which more evils grow.”26

Id.
17. Indictment at 3, United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 28, 2018).
18. Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 2, United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR
1339 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2018).
19. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 1, United States v. Mecham, No. 18
CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2019).
20. Verdict of the Court at 1, United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 7, 2019).
21. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR
1339 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2019).
22. Notice of the Filing of an Appeal, United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR
1339 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2019).
23. Jacklyn Wille, ‘Morphed’ Child Pornography Not Protected Speech, 5th
Cir. Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 13, 2020), www.news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/morphed-child-pornography-not-protected-speech-5th-cir-says/
[perma.cc/32WC-THB2].
24. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 257.
25. United States v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2309 (2015).
26. Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting Our Children and the
Constitution: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 146
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II. BACKGROUND
In February 2020, the Fifth Circuit heard Mecham’s appeal in
United States v. Mecham27 and ultimately joined the Second and
Sixth Circuits in holding that “morphed child pornography does not
enjoy First Amendment protection.”28 After learning what Mecham
had done, this should not be shocking to anyone. What is shocking
is that not all jurisdictions agree; the Eighth Circuit has continued
to abide by their 2014 decision in Anderson that, in order to be
categorically excluded from the First Amendment, child
pornography needs to depict the underlying crime of child abuse.29
Although the Anderson court found that the government had met
its burden under strict scrutiny, the underlying message is
certainly cause for concern.30
To comprehend the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and its
implications, it is imperative to understand, first, the evolution of
child pornography laws in the United States, second, Mecham’s case
and subsequent appeal, and third, the conflict Anderson imposes.31

A. The Evolution of Child Pornography Laws
Surprisingly, child pornography laws are a fairly modern
development,32 as state prosecutions for the publication of “lewd or
obscene” material began to occur in the nineteenth century.33 In the
1800s, the government enacted two primary obscenity laws, which
were the closest thing to regulating child pornography at the time:
the Tariff Act barred the importation of obscene material in 1842,34
and the Comstock Act criminalized mailing obscene material in
1873.35 These two Acts prompted Congress to enact approximately
(2002) (statement of Hon. Earl Pomeroy, Cong. Rep. from North Dakota)
[hereinafter Stopping Child Pornography].
27. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
28. Id.
29. See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895 (holding that, in order to be categorically
excluded from the First Amendment, child pornography needs to depict the
underlying crime of child abuse).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 261.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. In 1873, Anthony Comstock persuaded Congress to pass the “Act for
the Suppression of Trade in Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of
Immoral Use.” Gretchen B. Gould, Obscenity and Pornography: A Historical
Look at the American Library Association, the Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography, and the Supreme Court 3 (Dec. 2010) (MA dissertation, University
of Northern Iowa). This act is more generally known as the Comstock Act and
it regulated the circulation of obscene materials through the mail. Id. Comstock
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twenty similar laws against obscenity from the mid-1800s to 1956.36
Because Congress had passed so many obscenity laws during this
time, there was not yet an apparent need for regulations specifically
targeting sexually obscene material involving children.37 Of course,
exactly what constitutes obscenity is still heavily debated.38 Until
the 1950s, obscene material included short films that showed
women in shorter-than-usual skirts,39 movies that involved actors
and actresses kissing one another,40 and books such as Ulysses,41
which was banned in 1920 for being “pornographic.”42

felt it was his responsibility to improve the morals of other people and bragged
that he was personally responsible for destroying “more than fifty tons of
indecent books, over 28,000 pounds of book printing plates, around four million
obscene pictures, over 16,000 negatives, and driving fifteen people to suicide.”
Id.
36. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 261.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.
concurring) (stating “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”).
39. Olivia B. Waxman, This Is What Americans Used to Consider Obscene,
TIME (June 21, 2016), www.time.com/4373765/history-obscenity-united-statesfilms-miller-ulysses-roth/ [perma.cc/5UZ3-N3BF]. In 1894, a twenty-one-second
clip shocked viewers because the woman shown in it occasionally tugged at the
bottom of her skirt and the crinolines were visible underneath. Id. The clip is
thought to be one of the first banned. Id.
40. Id. In a nineteen-second comedy clip, actress May Irwin and actor John
Rice nuzzled and kissed. Id. The clip was banned because viewers disapproved
of the “spectacle of their prolonged pasturing on each other’s lips . . .” Id. The
clip even prompted some viewers to call the police for intervention. Id.
41. Id. A portion of the book was published in Margaret Anderson’s Little
Review in 1918. Id. Subsequently, the United States Post Office Department
seized and burned all copies sent through the mail. Id. The book was banned “to
protect the delicate sensibilities of female readers.” David Bradshaw, Ulysses
and Obscenity, BRITISH LIBRARY (May 25, 2016), www.bl.uk/20th-centuryliterature/articles/ulysses-and-obscenity [perma.cc/6C3T-N22Q]. Specifically,
three issues were released between July and August of 1920 that involved
writings about early sexual experiences and men masturbating to women
showing off their legs. Id. Ironically, however, it was a female reader that
sparked the banning of Ulysses in the United States. Id. A New York attorney’s
impressionable young daughter got her hands on a copy and was so shocked
that it prompted the attorney to contact the New York District Attorney and
the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice. Id. In 1920, the New York
Society of Suppression of Vice successfully argued that Ulysses was obscene. Id.
42. United States v. One Book Called ‘Ulysses’, 5 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y.
1933). The book “Ulysses” was ultimately found to not be obscene around ten
years after it was banned. Id. at 185. The court rested its decision on the fact
that the book had an impressive reputation in the literary world. Id. at 183.
However, originally the United States government considered this book to be
obscene and copies were seized and burned by the United States Post Office.
Gould, supra note 35, at 5.
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1. Caselaw other than Mecham and Anderson
a. The Roth Test
Obscenity laws were first challenged on constitutional grounds
in 1957.43 In Roth v. United States, two mail-order businessmen
were convicted of mailing obscene materials in violation of 18 U.S.C
§ 1461.44 This statute criminalized mailing “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy” material.45 The Supreme Court applied a test
of whether the materials appealed to the prurient interest of the
contemporary community standards.46 Ultimately, Roth’s
conviction was upheld on the grounds that the First Amendment
was not intended to protect every utterance.47 The Court explained,
“[i]t has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest.”48
Justice Brennan wrote that obscenity was not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech.49 However, the Court
recognized that “sex and obscenity are not synonymous” and that
some depictions of sex are entitled to First Amendment protection.50
For example, the portrayal of sex “in art, literature, and scientific
works” is protected as free speech because of its decided literary
value.51
The Court likely thought it settled the matter when concocting
the Roth test, which asked: “whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests.”52
The Court leaned on its prior definition of prurient interest as “a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.”53 In other
words, obscenity was gauged by whether the average person
thought the material had or encouraged an excessive interest in

43. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 261.
44. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 480 (1957).
45. Id. at 491.
46. Id. at 489.
47. Id. at 483.
48. Id. at 485 (emphasis omitted).
49. Id. at 494.
50. Id. at 487.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 489. Prior to this test, another test existed: Whether the “standard
of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated
excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons.” Id. at 488-89 (citation omitted).
This test was adopted by some American courts, but the Supreme Court rejected
it on the grounds that it was too constitutionally restrictive on the freedoms of
speech. Id. at 489.
53. Id. at 487, n. 20 (citations omitted).
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sexual matters.54 In fact, the Court stated that the Roth test
“provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of
constitutional infirmity.”55 Essentially, the Court believed the
constitutionality of obscenity laws was solved with the inception of
the Roth test.56
b. The Memoirs Test
Unfortunately for the Roth test, not all justices agreed, and the
Roth test took a sharp, drastic turn with the 1966 decision in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, again authored by Justice Brennan.57
There, the Court elaborated upon the Roth test, ultimately creating
a more stringent threshold.58 The Memoirs test contained three
elements that had to be met: (1) “the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex”; (2)
“the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters”; and (3) “the material is utterly without
redeeming social value.”59 If each element was satisfied, the speech
was not entitled to First Amendment protection.60
For example, a movie entitled “The Devil in Miss Jones” failed
the Memoirs test.61 The film consisted of about fifty-four minutes
that almost exclusively depicted sexual conduct.62 The Court opined
that no matter what test was applied, “The Devil in Miss Jones” was
obscene.63
c.

The Miller Test

However, this quest to create a satisfactory test by which to
measure obscenity was not yet complete. In 1973, Justice Burger
opined in Miller v. California that the Memoirs test was far too
54. See Prurient, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020) (stating
that “prurient” means “marked by, arousing, or appealing to sexual desire.”).
55. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
56. Id.
57. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). In Memoirs, the
appellant’s book was found to be obscene and not protected by the First
Amendment. Id. at 420. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because the
book was found to have some literary value, it could not be seen as “utterly”
lacking redeeming social value and was therefore protected First Amendment
speech. Id. at 420.
58. Id. at 418.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Commonwealth v. “The Devil in Miss Jones”, 3 Va. Cir. 436, 444 (Va.
Cir. Ct. 1973). Although this case emerged after the Miller test was created,
the court noted “[n]o matter which test is applied, this film is obscene.” Id.
62. Id. at 442.
63. Id. at 444.
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stringent.64 For years, the Memoirs test prompted the Court to be
cautious not to strip citizens of their literary, artistic, and scientific
creativity.65 Miller criticized Memoirs as a standard that was nearly
impossible to meet because of the “utterly without redeeming social
value” language.66 The Miller Court began to recognize State
interests in prohibiting obscene material.67 So, once again, the
Court refigured its threshold.
The Miller test required that to be considered obscene, the
work as a whole must appeal to the “prurient interest in sex,” the
sexual conduct must be portrayed in a “patently offensive” way, and
the work must “not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.”68 The work in question needed to have an excessive
interest in sexual matters in addition to a lack of literary value,
whether it be artistic, political, or scientific. Despite the Court
failing to provide clarity as to what these terms meant, out of this
uncertain set of standards, child pornography laws were born. Four
years after Miller, Congress passed the Protection of Children
Against Child Exploitation Act in 1977.69 As the first federal law
that focused specifically on child pornography, the main goal of the
Act was to prevent children from falling victim to child
pornography.70 At the time of its enactment, only six states had laws
explicitly protecting children.71
d. The Ferber Test
At the time Congress enacted the Protection of Children
Against Child Exploitation Act, New York was one of only twenty
states that had laws explicitly prohibiting the distribution of child
pornography without requiring that the material be legally
obscene.72 In 1977, New York enacted Article 263 of its Penal Code,
which criminalized the distribution, but not possession, of child

64. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). Similar to Roth, the
defendant in Miller mailed pictures of sexually explicit content to individuals
who had not requested the material. Id. at 16. He was convicted of distributing
obscene matter. Id. at 16.
65. Id. at 24. Examples of nude material that the court found acceptable
would be “medical books” for the education of physicians. Id. at 26.
66. Id. at 22. The Memoirs test created a difficulty for prosecutors punishing
child pornography. Id. Memoirs protected the literary, artistic, and scientific
creativity by making it so that state law can only prohibit content if it has no
redeeming social value. Id.
67. Id. at 24.
68. Id.
69. Protection of Children Against Child Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978).
70. Id.
71. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 262.
72. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749-50 (1982).
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pornography.73 Multiple sections of Article 263 quickly worked their
way up to the Supreme Court, and in 1982, the Court upheld the
first criminal ban on the distribution of child pornography in New
York v. Ferber.74
In Ferber, Paul Ferber, the owner of a bookstore in Manhattan,
sold films to an undercover police officer that depicted young boys
masturbating.75 The Court held that child pornography was similar
to obscenity and thus not protected by the First Amendment if it
involved a visual depiction of sexual conduct by children without
“serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”76 Ultimately,
Ferber granted the States “greater leeway” in the regulation of child
pornography by developing a standard by which to judge child
pornography.77 The Ferber test was simply an adjustment of Miller’s
obscenity test,78 although Ferber did not require the trier of fact to
find that the material appealed to the prurient interest, nor did the
conduct displayed need to be patently offensive.79
The Court rationalized its decision with five important
reasons. The Court first asserted that the government undoubtedly
had an interest80 in “‘safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor.’”81 Second, the act of distributing sexually
explicit content involving children was intrinsically related to child
abuse in two ways: (1) it created a “permanent record” of the child
engaging in such explicit conduct, and (2) “the distribution network
for child pornography must be closed if the production of material
which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively
73. Id. at 749-50. In Ferber, a Manhattan bookstore was convicted of
promoting sexual performance when it sold films that showed young boys
masturbating, in violation of a statute criminalizing the knowing distribution
or promotion of sexual performances by children under the age of 16. Id. at 749,
751-52.
74. Id. at 774.
75. Id. at 751-52.
76. Id. at 761. The New York statute was upheld, and the Court stated that
the Miller test did not prohibit states from “going further” with their laws
against child pornography. Id.
77. Id. at 756.
78. Id. at 755.
79. Id. at 764.
80. See United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194, 203
(2003) (explaining that content-based restrictions are assessed by the two-part
strict scrutiny standard, whereby the government must have a “compelling
interest,” and its regulation must be “narrowly tailored to further those
interests”).
81. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). In other areas of the law, the Court had upheld
legislation aimed at protecting youth even if the laws were “sensitive” in the
area of constitutionally protected rights. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. For example,
the Court had recently upheld a law “protecting children from exposure to
nonobscene literature” in 1968. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. State of N.Y., 390 U.S.
629 (1968)).
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controlled.”82 Third, advertising and selling child pornography
created an economic incentive to produce child pornography, which
was an illegal activity across the Nation.83 Fourth, depictions of
children engaging in sexual acts could hardly be said to offer
“important and necessary” literary, scientific, or educational
value.84 Finally, the Court found that excluding child pornography
from First Amendment protections was not inconsistent with
earlier decisions.85 This analysis in Ferber was “grounded . . . in a
previously recognized, long-established category of unprotected
speech,”86 that is, “speech integral to criminal conduct, namely the
sexual abuse of minors inherent in the production of child
pornography.”87
e.

Osborne v. Ohio

Working off of a similar rationale in Ferber, the Court ruled
eight years later in Osborne v. Ohio that states were not only
authorized to ban the distribution of child pornography but were
equally empowered to ban its possession.88 Clyde Osborne was
convicted of violating an Ohio statute when police found four
photographs that depicted nude male adolescents posed in sexually
explicit ways in his home.89 Osborne argued that the First
Amendment protected the private possession of child
pornography.90 However, the Court rejected this argument and

82. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. The Court felt that it would be impossible to
stop the exploitation of children if those who produced sexually explicit content
were the only ones pursued. Id. at 759-60.
83. Id. at 761. The constitutional freedom for speech rarely has extended its
protection to make legal violations of valid criminal statutes. Id. at 761-62.
84. Id. at 762-63. It is also important to note that the Court was only
interested in restricting “real” child pornography. Id. at 763. Portrayal of
explicit content made to look like children engaging in sexual acts, but actually
involving adults, is protected First Amendment speech. Id. The Court noted
that, if it were absolutely necessary for artistic value to depict children engaged
in sexual conduct, it could be done so with of-age individuals acting the part of
children. Id.
85. Id. at 763. For example, libel is not protected by the Constitution. Id.
86. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010).
87. Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
88. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). Petitioner argued that to
narrow the statute to making possession illegal would be unconstitutional. Id.
at 112-13. The Court disagreed. Id. at 113. The statute was not overbroad
because the Court construed it to apply only to a depiction of nudity that
“constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves graphic focus on the genitals.” Id.
Additionally, because the statute only sought to protect children from child
pornography rather than “regulating a person’s mind,” restriction was
permitted. Id. at 109.
89. Id. at 107.
90. Id. Osborne relied on the Court’s decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969), which struck down a Georgia law that made the private possession
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explained that a State has a great interest in “safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor.”91 The Court
rationalized, much like the third reason explained in Ferber, that it
was reasonable for a State to impose laws that banned possession
of child pornography in order to decrease the production and
demand for child pornography.92
f.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

As the Internet became more accessible, the need to protect
children from child pornography became even greater.93 Because of
this, Congress attempted to broaden federal regulations even
further with the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
(“CPPA”).94 The CPPA revised the definition of “visual depiction” to
include data stored on computers including virtual95 and morphed
child pornography.96 But this expansion only lasted until 2002,
when it came under fire for violating the First Amendment in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.97 There, the Supreme Court ruled
that certain provisions of the CPPA violated the First Amendment
for three reasons, ultimately rendering those provisions
unconstitutional.98 First, unlike “real” child pornography, virtual
child pornography was not “intrinsically related to sexual abuse of
children.”99 Second, some works in the category of child
of obscene material illegal. Osbourne, 495 U.S. at 108. However, the Court
distinguished Osborne from Stanley; Georgia enacted its law to ban obscenity
because “it was concerned that obscenity would poison the minds of its viewers,”
whereas Ohio enacted its law to protect victims of child pornography, as “it
hope[d] to destroy a market for the exploitative use of children.” Id. at 109.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240.
94. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
Additionally, this Act further restricted individual’s ability to possess child
pornography. Id. It is now a crime to possess any book, magazine, periodical,
film, videotape, computer disk, or other material that contains three or more
images of child pornography. Id.
95. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 241. A provision of the CPPA prohibited
the possession or distribution of child pornography defined as “including any
visual depiction that is or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.” Id.
96. H.R. 4123, supra note 94; see 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (1996) (amending the
definition of child pornography to include the concept of morphed child
pornography).
97. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240. Multiple plaintiffs alleged that
provisions of the CPPA prohibited them from creating content for their adult
films in a way that violated the First Amendment. Id. at 243.
98. Id. at 258. The CPPA extended the prohibition against child
pornography to images and videos that appeared to depict minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct, even if they were not produced using real children. Id.
at 241. In fact, Congress’ motive was to ban virtual child pornography. Id.
99. Id. at 250.
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pornography might possibly have significant literary or artistic
value.100 Last, the Court found the argument that virtual child
pornography should be banned on the grounds that pedophiles may
use it to lure children to be an insufficient justification.101 The Court
pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C), which prohibits “a more common
and lower tech means of creating virtual images known as computer
morphing” where “pornographers can alter innocent pictures of real
children so that they appear to be engaged in sexual activity.”102
Importantly, the statute underscores how “[a]lthough morphed
images may fall within the definition of virtual child pornography,
they implicate the interests of real children.”103 Ultimately, “the
Supreme Court decision in the Free Speech Coalition case has made
it far more difficult to take action against this evil” that is morphed
child pornography.104
g. Post-Free Speech Coalition
Free Speech Coalition’s impact was deafening, and the
government’s broad ability to prosecute child pornography after its
opinion was sharply curtailed.105 In response, Congress enacted the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End Exploitation of
Children Today (“PROTECT”) Act.106 The Act signified critical
progress in the protection of America’s children as it “gave law
enforcement authorities valuable new tools to prevent, deter,
investigate, prosecute, and punish violent crimes committed
against children,” while also “strengthening programs, and
addressing deficiencies in Federal sentencing policies and
practices.”107 The PROTECT Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) to
read, in pertinent part, as follows: “[S]uch visual depiction is a
digital image, computer image, or computer generated image that
is, or is indistinguishable from that of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.”108
Today, under the PROTECT Act, categories of child
pornography that are considered free speech include “virtual” child
pornography,109 which is the digital creation of minors engaged in
100. Id. at 251.
101. Id. 251-52.
102. Id. at 242.
103. Id.
104. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 26.
105. Prosecutorial Remedies Act and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today ("PROTECT”) Act of 2003, 108 Pub. L. No. 21, 117 Stat. 650,
108 Pub L. No. 21, 2003 Enacted S. 151 [hereinafter PROTECT Act].
106. Id.
107.
PROTECT
Act
of
2003,
GOVINFO
(Apr.
30,
2019),
www.govinfo.gov/features/PROTECT-act [perma.cc/RR6G-53FB].
108. PROTECT Act, supra note 105.
109. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
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sexually explicit conduct, but which, importantly, no real children
are involved.110 Pornography that depicts adults made to look like
children engaging in sexually explicit conduct is also considered
protected First Amendment speech.111 With regard to morphed
child pornography, a type of pornography that “falls in between
those two categories,”112 the language of the PROTECT Act,
concerningly, leaves ample room for interpretation.113
h. United States v. Stevens
The Court has declined to analyze the characterization of
morphed child pornography in the past.114 In fact, the Court merely
furthered confusion on the matter in 2010 in United States v.
Stevens.115 This case did not involve child pornography.116 Rather,
respondent Stevens was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 48, which
criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of
depictions of animal crush and cruelty videos.117 Stevens was selling
videos of dogfighting and argued that the statute was
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.118 On the other
hand, the government argued that animal cruelty should be
prohibited because of its long history of prohibition in American
law.119
The Court used Ferber as a way to distinguish the prohibition

110. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 241.
111. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
112. Id.
113. PROTECT Act, supra note 105. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2010) provides
that child pornography includes any “visual depiction [that] has been created,
adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaged in sexually
explicit conduct.” Id. (emphasis added). “Modified to appear” may suggest
morphed child pornography, but arguably does not; in Free Speech Coalition,
the Supreme Court stated that Section 2256(8)(C) embodied morphed child
pornography, but it also stated that morphed child pornography could be
categorized as virtual child pornography. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
114. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242. Here, the Supreme Court does
briefly mention that morphed child pornography is closer to Ferber in the sense
that images of real children are involved but made no definitive answer on how
to treat morphed child pornography. Id.
115. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
116. Id.at 466.
117. Id. at 464-65. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2010) criminalizes knowingly creating,
selling, or possessing depictions of animal cruelty. Id. at 464. “The legislative
background of [Section] 48 focused primarily on the interstate market for ‘crush
videos.’” Id. at 465 (citations omitted). Generally, “animal crush” videos are
videos that depict women “slowly crushing animals to death with their bare feet
or while wearing high heeled shoes.” Id. Sometimes, these videos include women
talking to the animals “in a kind of dominatrix patter over the cries of the
animals, obviously in great pain.” Id. at 466.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 469.
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of child pornography and the prohibition of animal cruelty.120 The
Court explained that child pornography was categorically
unprotected in Ferber because it involved visual depictions that
were produced through the actual sexual abuse of children.121 First
Amendment protection did not depend on a simple cost-benefit
analysis.122 Rather, First Amendment protection extended to all
speech outside the “historic and traditional categories long familiar
to the bar.”123 Stevens emphasized that Ferber was a special case
because it presented a situation where the market for child
pornography was so intrinsically related to the underlying abuse
that the market was an integral part of the nationally-prohibited
production of child pornography.124 The Court found that Ferber’s
rationale could not be applied to the facts in Stevens.125 The Court
put it bluntly, stating that it could not be “suggested that
constitutional freedom [of] speech . . . extends its immunity to
speech . . . used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid
criminal statute.”126
Until Mecham was decided in 2020, only three circuits, the
Second, the Sixth, and the Eighth, had ruled on the issue of whether
morphed child pornography was protected by the First
Amendment.127
2. Statutes
Today, child pornography regulations are codified in Title 18,
Chapter 110 of the United States Code, under “sexual exploitation
and other abuse of children.”128 The overarching goal of Title 18
Chapter 110 is to criminalize the distribution of child
pornography.129
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A provides that “[a]ny person …
who knowingly . . . distributes any child pornography using any
means . . . including by computer . . . shall be fined under this title
and imprisoned not less than [five] years and not more than
[twenty] years.”130 Section 2256(8) contains important definitions,
outlining that child pornography encompasses: “[A]ny visual
120. Id.
121. Id. at 471.
122. Id. The reason the Court brought Ferber and child pornography into
this analysis in the first place was because the government was attempting to
use Ferber-esque rationale. Id. at 470-72.
123. Id. at 468.
124. Id. at 471.
125. Id. at 472.
126. Id. at 471.
127. Willie, supra note 23.
128. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260A (2021).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2021).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)(A)–(b)(1) (2021).
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depiction, including any photography, film, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by
electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit
conduct.”131
Included in this definition are various subsections detailing
scenarios in which child pornography is deemed illegal.132 For
example, Section 2256(8)(A) prohibits “the production of such visual
depiction [that] involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.”133 Moreover, Section 2256(8)(B) prohibits any
visual depiction that “is a digital image, computer image, or
computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”134 Importantly,
Section 2256(8)(C) prohibits any visual depiction that “has been
created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor
is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”135
While the PROTECT Act is a noble start, its efforts have little
bearing on the issue as the lineage of caselaw regarding child
pornography continues to unfold.
3. Sadism Sentence-Enhancement Caselaw
A four-level sentence enhancement can apply to material
that “portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions
of violence.” 136 Sentencing enhancements are:
policies that mandate that people who are convicted of criminalized
behaviors while engaging in generally non-criminalized behaviors . .
. or having generally non-criminalized traits . . . receive longer and
surer sentences than those who are convicted of the same
criminalized behaviors without engaging in these . . . non-criminal
behaviors[.]137

In June 2015, Calvin Nesmith was found to have images that
contained child pornography.138 One particular image showed a
sleeping minor female with Nesmith’s “erect penis on the minor’s
lips.”139 Throughout the investigation, the minor was made aware

131. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2021).
132. Id.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2021).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2021).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2021).
136. United States v. Nesmith, 866 F.3d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4)).
137.
Traci
Schlesinger,
Sentencing
Enhancements,
OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES 2 (Feb. 27, 2019),
www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo9780195396607-0262.xml [perma.cc/A7SV-EM4B].
138. Nesmith, 866 F.3d at 678.
139. Id.
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of the existence of this image.140 The government moved to apply
the four-level sentencing enhancement for sadism.141 The Fifth
Circuit ultimately found that a sadism enhancement was an
objective standard.142 Further, the court held that the sadistic
sentence enhancement applied only where emotional or physical
pain had been contemporaneous with the creation of the image.143
Because the child was sleeping and not physically or emotionally
harmed at the time the photo was taken, the court declined to add
the sentence enhancement.144

B. United States v. Mecham
As mentioned in the Introduction, a total of 33,303 media
depicting morphed child pornography was seized from five
electronic devices owned by Clifford Mecham. 145 These photographs
and videos were created by Mecham himself and many of them were
morphed using his minor granddaughter’s faces.146
While Mecham was in custody, he told authorities that he
thought the images were “cute.”147 Mecham even went as far as emailing some of his creations to his sixteen-year-old
granddaughter.148 One of those videos showed Mecham’s face
superimposed onto an adult male engaging in oral, vaginal, and
anal sex with an adult female who had the superimposed face of his
sixteen-year-old granddaughter on the receiving end of the email.149
Through computer animation, Mecham manipulated the footage “to
show the male ejaculating, with the semen shooting to the
granddaughter’s mouth.”150 Another video, lasting eight minutes
and forty-three seconds, added “the face of [his] five-year-old
granddaughter to a montage of photos of an adult female engaging
in oral, vaginal, and anal sex” with Mecham’s face on the adult

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 679. The court concluded that the sentencing enhancement
should be applied objectively due to the plain language of § 2G2.1(b)(4). Id.
“[T]he text emphasizes what objectively appears to be happening, not what
actually occurred.” Id. at 680.
143. Id. at 681.
144. Id. at 681-82. Part of the court’s decision rested on policy; without the
contemporaneous requirement, the sentence enhancement would apply in every
child pornography case regardless of the content because any child who
discovers they are the subject of child pornography will feel some level of
emotional or psychological pain. Id. at 681.
145. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
146. Id.
147. Septuagenarian Heads to Prison, supra note 2.
148. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
149. Id. at 260.
150. Id.
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male.151 When law enforcement asked him to explain why he
created these images and videos and sent them to his sixteen-yearold granddaughter, Mecham replied that it was his way of “getting
back” at his family for preventing him from seeing the children.152
Allegedly, Mecham had spent many years of his life interacting with
his granddaughters only to be suddenly cut off.153
1. The District Court
Despite the undisputed fact that Mecham distributed “at least
some” of the videos to his granddaughter, a grand jury charged
Mecham only with possession of child pornography, not
distribution.154 On January 7, 2019, Mecham proceeded to a
stipulated bench trial155 where the government presented just two
exhibits: a stipulation to agreed facts (mainly, that Mecham had
created and possessed the images and videos in question) and a disk
containing one almost nine-minute video in which “eight different
images are being shown at any given time, and every few seconds
one of the tiles changes out, and each of the images are all
pornographic in nature.”156 The particular video included only one
of Mecham’s granddaughters, who was five years old at the time the
photograph was used.157
In finding him guilty, the district court asserted that the video
presented by the government met the definition of morphed child
pornography under Section 2256(8)(C).158 It found that, first,
Mecham “knowingly possessed an item or items that contain[ed] an
image of child pornography,” second, “the material was mailed,
shipped, and transported in or affecting interstate and foreign
commerce,” and third, when Mecham possessed the material, he
“knew the material contained child pornography.”159 The court
151. Id. at 261.
152. Id. at 260.
153. Id. As explained in Mecham’s initial sentencing hearing, one of the
incidents that led to his family cutting him off occurred after his daughter grew
suspicious that Mecham “might have been grooming one of the daughters.”
Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 31, United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339
(S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019). After Mecham left his daughter’s house one day, she
asked Mecham to text him when he arrived home. Id. Upon his return home,
Mecham allegedly texted his daughter saying, “The pedophile has landed.” Id.
at 32.
154. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 261.
155. Pretrial Conference and Stipulated Bench Trial Transcript at 3, United
States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2019); Septuagenarian
Heads to Prison, supra note 2.
156. Pretrial Conference and Stipulated Bench Trial Transcript at 6, United
States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2019).
157. Id. at 11.
158. Id. at 15.
159. Verdict of the Court at 1, United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339
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classified the video as “sado-masochistic” and recognized that the
“harm to the child is unbelievable, actually, showing her engaged in
sexual intercourse with an adult.”160 Because of this, a four-point
upward adjustment, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)(A), was
applied “for display of masochistic or sadistic conduct.”161
2. Sentencing
On May 17, 2019, Mecham was sentenced.162 During the
sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued against certain
enhancements that the government intended to apply to
Mecham.163
First, the defense counsel objected to the specific offense
characteristic in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2), which provides for a twopoint increase “[i]f the material involved a prepubescent minor or a
minor who had not attained the age of 12 years.”164 In overruling
the objection, the court rejected Mecham’s argument that real
children were not harmed in the making of his morphed child
pornography.165
Second, the defense counsel argued against the specific offense
characteristic in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).166 U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)
provides the four-point increase “[i]f the offense involved material
that portrays (A) sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions
of violence; or (B) sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant
toddler.”167 Defense counsel cited Nesmith, for the proposition that
a contemporaneous injury was necessary to apply the
enhancement.168 The court again overruled the objection.169
Ultimately, Mecham’s total offense level was thirty, and his
criminal history category was ‘I,’ resulting in a guideline range of
ninety-seven months to one hundred and twenty-one months.170
While the government requested a sentence of ninety-seven months’
imprisonment, Mecham asked for a downward departure to forty-

(S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2019).
160. Pretrial Conference and Stipulated Bench Trial Transcript at 18,
United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2019).
161. Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 21, United States v. Mecham, No. 18
CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019).
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 6-7; U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2).
165. Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 9, United States v. Mecham, No. 18
CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019).
166. Id.
167. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4).
168. Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 10, United States v. Mecham, No. 18
CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 21.
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eight months.171
Despite his attorney arguing that “there was no actual victim
harmed,” Mecham was sentenced to ninety-seven months (eight
years) in federal prison.172 The court emphasized the need to protect
the community, particularly because Mecham seemed to lack any
concept of knowing that what he had done was wrong.173 The
imposed sentence also required that, once released from prison,
Mecham would spend the rest of his life on supervised release with
specific requirements tailored to restricting his access to children
and the internet.174 The court also noted that “part of the supervised
release conditions are going to be no contact with any of these
victims, ever.”175 Mecham was also ordered to pay $2,966.78 in
restitution to the victims and register as a sex offender.176
In attempting to justify his actions, Mecham told the court that
he was mad at his family members because they “thought I was a
pedophile, which I am not.”177 In his final statement to the court,
Mecham stated that he was not aware that what he did was against
the law and that his understanding of child pornography “would be
using a child to make pornography.”178 To close, the court expressed
its concerns about Mecham’s supervision lasting the rest of his life
171. Id. at 24, 27. Mecham’s attorney asked for a decrease in sentencing
largely because there was no physical abuse to the victims in the photographs.
Id. at 36. Harping on this fact, Mecham’s counsel stated, “[a]gain, . . . the type
of pornographic images that we had here, as opposed to other pornographic
images that we usually see or the Court has usually seen where there’s actual
physical abuse to the victims, but that didn’t occur here[.]” Id.
172. Id. at 6. Defense counsel justified its request of 48 months’
imprisonment by citing Mecham’s two tours in Vietnam and subsequent
struggles with post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 27.
173. Septuagenarian Heads to Prison, supra note 2.
174. Id.
175. Pretrial Conference and Stipulated Bench Trial Transcript at 19,
United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2019).
176. Septuagenarian Heads to Prison, supra note 2.
177. Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 32, United States v. Mecham, No. 18
CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019). The court responded, “I wonder what he
would call it, making pedophile pictures of his grandchildren having
pornographic sex.” Id. at 32-33. On allocution, he then claimed he made the
videos because his family had unfriended and blocked him on Facebook, which
he thought was unwarranted considering that he had “spent [ten] or [fifteen]
thousand dollars on them just in gifts” over the past ten years. Id. at 38. He
further claimed that his actions were perpetuated by him thinking it was “cute,”
but the prosecution detailed the victim impact statements which include
Mecham’s granddaughters describing how uncomfortable he made them. Id.
178. Id. at 42. Keep in mind, prior to 2003, Mecham had extremely limited
contact with his daughter; Mecham’s ex-wife moved back to Germany with his
daughter when she was very young. Id. at 37. Until 2003, Mecham saw his
daughter only two times, once when she was twelve and once when she was
thirteen. Id. Therefore, Mecham’s argument that he produced these videos
because his family was cutting him out of their lives, rather than because he
has pedophilic tendencies is rather weak.
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because he didn’t seem to understand the significance of what he
had done.179 Mecham appealed the district court’s ruling to the Fifth
Circuit and based his argument, in large part, off of Stevens – the
case that later persuaded the Eighth Circuit to conclude that
“morphed child pornography created without any child being
abused is protected First Amendment speech.”180

C. The Conflict of United States v. Anderson
Decided in 2014, United States v. Anderson sits in direct
opposition to Mecham. In Anderson, the mother of an eleven-yearold girl, M.A., reported to the Nebraska State Patrol in June 2012
that M.A. had received unsolicited sexually explicit messages and
images from a Facebook account under the name of “Bob
Shepherd.”181 After assuming control of M.A.’s Facebook account,
Nebraska authorities revealed that “Bob Shepherd” was actually
the eleven-year-old girl’s half-brother, twenty-seven-year-old
Jeffrey Anderson.182 The images that Anderson sent to his halfsister portrayed her own face superimposed over the faces of adult
females engaged in sexually explicit conduct.183
1. The District Court
On August 22, 2012, Anderson was indicted in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nebraska on four counts stemming from
the sexual enticement and abuse of a minor, with Count Three
specifically addressing morphed child pornography.184 He filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that Count One infringed “upon

179. Id. at 43.
180. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 264 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464). Similar to
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Anderson, supra note 25, Mecham argued that
his homemade morphed child pornography was entitled to First Amendment
protection because it did not depict the actual sexual abuse of a child, even
though faces of real, identifiable children were used. The Fifth Circuit
ultimately affirmed Mecham’s conviction and remanded for resentencing, as
discussed infra. Id.
181. Anderson, 759 F.3d at 893.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Indictment at 1–2, United States v. Anderson, No. 12 CR 3038 (D. Neb.
Aug. 22, 2012). Count One alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and
2256(8)(A). Id. at 1. Count Two alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(7)
and 2256(8)(A). Id. at 1–2. Count Four alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
Id. at 2. Count Three alleged that “[o]n or about July 5, 2012, in the District of
Nebraska, Jeffrey A. Anderson, the defendant herein, did unlawfully and
knowingly produce with the intent to distribute and did distribute by any
means, including by a computer in interstate commerce, child pornography that
is an adapted or modified depiction of an identifiable minor” in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(7) and 2256(8)(A). Id.
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his right to engage in free speech protected under the United States
Constitution.”185 Anderson argued that Section 2256(8)’s definitions
were overbroad since “the image in this case – an image of an adult
female morphed with M.A.’s head and face engaging in a sexual act
– [did] not include an identifiable minor actually engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.”186 The Magistrate Judge denied the
motion on December 26, 2012 on the grounds that M.A. was an
identifiable minor and a real victim with real injuries.187 Thus,
Anderson’s alleged conduct was not protected by the First
Amendment
Anderson ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea as to
Count One, which alleged the distribution of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2)(A) and 2256(8).188 The
remaining counts were dismissed.189
2. The Appeal
Anderson filed a notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit
challenging both his conviction and sentence.190 In regard to the
morphed child pornography charge, Anderson argued that 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) were
unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to him pursuant to the
First Amendment.191 While the government asserted that the
morphed image Anderson sent should fall under a category of
unprotected speech, the Eighth Circuit found the argument
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stevens.192
The court explained that, in Stevens, the Supreme Court “clarified
that child pornography was categorically unprotected in Ferber
because it involved visual depictions that were produced through
sexual abuse of one of more children.”193 This meant that “First
Amendment protection does not depend on ‘a simple cost-benefit
analysis,’ but rather extends to all speech outside the ‘historical and
traditional categories long familiar to the bar.’”194
185. Findings, Recommendation and Order at 6, United States v. Anderson,
No. 12 CR 3038 (D. Neb. Dec. 26, 2012).
186. Id.; Motion to Dismiss, and Request for Evidentiary Hearing and Oral
Argument at 1, United States v. Anderson, No. 12 CR 3083 (D. Neb. Nov. 7,
2012).
187. Findings, Recommendation and Order at 1, United States v. Anderson,
No. 12 CR 3038 (D. Neb. Dec. 26, 2012).
188. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Anderson, No. 12 CR 3083 (D.
Neb. Mar. 7, 2013).
189. Id.
190. Notice of Appeal at 2, United States v. Anderson, No. 12 CR 3083 (D.
Neb. June 14, 2013).
191. Anderson, 759 F.3d at 893.
192. Id. at 894 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471).
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 at 471, 468).
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The Anderson court contrasted the facts at hand with those in
a previous Eighth Circuit decision, United States v. Bach.195 In
2005, Bach held that the image of a minor’s head morphed onto
another minor’s nude body was the type of harm that could be
constitutionally prosecuted under Ferber.196 The difference between
the image that Anderson created and the image in Bach turned on
the fact that Anderson’s image morphed a child’s face onto an adult
body, whereas the image in Bach morphed a child’s face onto
another child’s body.197 Therefore, the Anderson court found that
the image in Bach recorded actual sexual abuse by showing the
body of a child engaging in sexual conduct, consistent with
Stevens.198 Conversely, no minor was actually abused in the
production of Anderson’s images.199
The Eighth Circuit, working off of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Stevens, emphasized that “unless the Court were to
conclude that morphed images like Anderson’s come within the
category of speech that has been historically unprotected, but not
yet specifically identified in case law,” the difference between the
image in Bach and Anderson’s image was significant enough to
distinguish Anderson’s from unprotected speech.200 Essentially, the
issue of whether morphed child pornography is protected speech
turns on whether it involves the actual criminal sexual abuse of a
minor.201
III. ANALYSIS
This section will analyze Mecham by, first, taking a closer look
at Mecham’s arguments on appeal, second, analyzing the Fifth
Circuit’s holding and reasoning, and, finally, highlighting Mecham’s
impact on the current legal landscape of morphed child
195. Id.; see Bach, 400 F.3d at 624 (explaining that Dale Robert Bach was
convicted for possessing an image of a young boy who was sitting in a tree
displaying his genitals, and that, over the young nude boy’s head, Bach had
morphed the face of another minor whom he had been communicating with
online).
196. Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
197. Id. The Bach Court found that the image there implicated the interests
of the child whose face superimposed over the naked minor. Bach, 400 F.3d at
632. The image had been so skillfully created that it appeared that the child
whose face was used was engaging in a lascivious display of his genitals with a
knowing grin on his face. Id.
198. Id. at 895.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. It is important to note that the Eighth Circuit ultimately did uphold
Anderson’s conviction. Id. The government urged the court that the child
pornography statutes as applied to Anderson also satisfy strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment. Id. Under strict scrutiny, the government argued that
the statute is justified by a compelling interest and narrowly drawn to serve
that interest. Id.
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pornography.

A. Mecham’s Arguments
After Mecham was sentenced to ninety-seven months’
imprisonment for one count of possession of child pornography, he
appealed his judgment and conviction to the Fifth Circuit.202 He
asserted an as-applied challenge, claiming that 18 U.S.C. §§
2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(C) were “unconstitutional as applied to
him when no child was sexually abused in the production of the
morphed pornographic images he possessed” and that the
government “cannot show that restricting his possession of such
images is actually necessary to safeguard the physical or
psychological well-being of a child.”203 Mecham also claimed that
“the district court reversibly erred in applying a four-level ‘sadism’
enhancement at sentencing, without applying the appropriate legal
standard.”204 The ultimate question on appeal was whether the kind
of “morphed image[s]” Mecham created “qualify as expressive
speech that is protected under the First Amendment.”205 This was
a question of first impression in the Fifth Circuit.206
First, Mecham argued that his morphed child pornography did
not constitute unprotected child pornography under the First
Amendment because “no minor was sexually abused in the
production of the morphed images, and the images thus were not
integral to criminal conduct (namely, the sexual abuse of minors
inherent in the production of child pornography).”207 Mecham relied
heavily on Stevens’s interpretation of Ferber.208 He argued that
Ferber was a special case inapplicable to his set of facts because the
decision “grounded its analysis in previously recognized, long
established category of unprotected speech.”209 According to
Mecham, his videos and images were not used as an integral part
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.210 Mecham urged
the Fifth Circuit to side with the Eighth Circuit and rule that
“where no minor was sexually abused in the production of morphed
images, and the images thus were not integral to criminal conduct
. . . the images do not fall into the child-pornography category of

202. Notice of Appeal at 1, United States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 10, 2019).
203. Brief for Appellant at ii, United States v. Mecham, No. 19-40319 (5th
Cir. July 29, 2019).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 18.
208. Id. at 19.
209. Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. 756).
210. Brief for Appellant at 20, United States v. Mecham, No. 19-40319 (5th
Cir. July 29, 2019) (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471).
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unprotected speech.”211 Mecham contended that the Eighth
Circuit’s approach was best because it took Stevens into account.212
Unlike the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit
analyzed Stevens and read it as a warning against using Ferber as
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside
the scope of the First Amendment.”213
The government, in turn, urged the Fifth Circuit to “join four
of its sister circuits—the First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits—
in rejecting” Mecham’s claims that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and
2256(8)(C) were unconstitutional.214 The government argued that
Mecham’s images used the identifiable faces of his minor
grandchildren and formed a permanent record of sexual
exploitation.215 The government contended that the Eighth Circuit’s
reasoning in Anderson was actually flawed because it gave too much
weight to Stevens.216 The Supreme Court in Stevens was simply
using Ferber as a way to reject the government’s argument that
animal cruelty should be unprotected free speech based on a simple
balancing test.217 The government argued that the Supreme Court
had consistently recognized that child pornography threatened
emotional and reputational harm to children, and thus, 18 U.S.C. §
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(C) were constitutional as applied to
Mecham’s facts.218
Next, Mecham argued that the four-level “sadism”
enhancement was applied in error.219 Under Nesmith, an image is
sadistic if it depicts conduct that appears to cause physical or
emotional pain simultaneously with the image’s creation.220
Mecham argued that the district court was dismissive of his
Nesmith argument and that it should have been held that the
211. Id. at 22.
212. Id. at 23. Basically, Mecham relies extremely heavily on the one
paragraph mention of child pornography in Stevens. Id. Although Stevens had
nothing to do with child pornography, Mecham organizes his entire brief around
the slight mention of child pornography and acts as if the Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation is undoubtedly the best. Id.
213. Id. at 23 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472).
214. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 26, United States v. Mecham, No. 1940319 (5th Cir. July 29, 2019).
215. Id. at 26. Mecham’s grandchildren were sexually exploited by a trusted
adult and “are now at everlasting risk of psychological, emotional, and
reputational harm.” Id. (citing Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730).
216. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257
(2020) (No. 19-40319). The government interpreted the Supreme Court’s
mention of Ferber in Stevens as a distinction between animal cruelty as its own
unprotected category of speech and child pornography as its own unprotected
category of speech. Id. at 27.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 28.
219. Brief for Appellant at 26, United States v. Mecham, No. 19-40319 (5th
Cir. July 29, 2019).
220. Id. (citing Nesmith, 866 F.3d at 681).
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Nesmith standard applied.221 Because nowhere in the presentencing report PSR asserted that the images Mecham created
depicted conduct that could be objectively perceived as causing the
children pain contemporaneously with their creation, Mecham
argued they met the Nesmith standard.222
The government argued that sadism is defined as “the
infliction of pain upon a love object as a means of obtaining sexual
release.”223 Further, the government explains that when
pornographic images depict an adult male engaging in sex with a
young girl, the conduct is sadistic because it is portrayed as painful
or abusive.224 Although Mecham superimposed his granddaughter’s
face onto the body of an adult, he selected “youthful, small-breasted
women” to make it appear as if the victim actually was his five-yearold granddaughter.225 According to the government, the guidelines
did not require the image to be accurate documentation of real
sadism.226 Therefore, because the image showed intercourse
between an adult male and a young girl, an objective observer would
perceive conduct that caused pain to the victim in the image
contemporaneously with its creation.227

B. The Fifth Circuit’s Analysis
On February 13, 2020, the Fifth Circuit decided Mecham’s
appeal.228 The court noted that “there are reasoned arguments on
both sides of the issue,” as is typical when a circuit split exists.229 In
emphasizing the importance of showing restraint when Supreme
Court caselaw is arguably in flux, the court underscored, “[w]e are
not supposed to get ahead of the Supreme Court and read tea leaves

221. Brief for Appellant at 25, United States v. Mecham 950 F.3d 257 (2020)
(No. 19-40319). Interestingly, the District Court judge that presided over
Mecham’s sentencing hearing also presided over Nesmith. Id. at 26. When
Mecham tried to argue Nesmith, the judge refused to apply the standard and,
rather, tossed the issue to the appellate court. Id. “We are going to give [the
Fifth Circuit] more cases, then, to look at.” Id.
222. Id. at 28.
223. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 43, United States v. Mecham, No. 1940319 (5th Cir. July 29, 2019).
224. Id. at 44.
225. Id. at 45.
226. Id. at 46. Both the First and Second Circuits have upheld the
application of sadism enhancements to morphed child pornography. Id. (citing
Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730-31).
227. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Mecham 950 F.3d 257
(2020) (No. 19-40319). The government used the Nesmith standard to explain
that regardless of whether the body of a child was used in the images, the body
of a young female was used, thus satisfying Nesmith. Id.
228. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
229. Id. at 265.
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to predict where it might end up.”230 Ultimately, however, the Fifth
Circuit sided with the majority view and held that morphed child
pornography was not protected speech, and thus, Mecham could not
evade punishment.231 His conviction was upheld but the court
remanded the case for resentencing.232
In reaching this conclusion, the court explained the need for a
balancing test and rejected the Stevens rationale, emphasized the
detriment of categorical exclusions, and distinguished “real” child
pornography from morphed child pornography.233 Finally, the Fifth
Circuit declined to uphold the district court’s four-level
enhancement for a child pornography offense that involved
“material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other
depictions of violence”234 because the government failed to show that
the sentencing enhancement was harmless.235
1. Balancing Test vs. Preventing Harm
The Fifth Circuit noted that previous caselaw regarding
morphed child pornography warned against “relying solely on a
balancing approach when determining if a category of speech is
excluded from the First Amendment.”236 Rather, the standard trend
was once to balance the literary value of the obscene material with
the prurient interest.237 Now, many courts rely heavily on the
established fact that using identifiable images of real children
implicates reputational and emotional harm.238 This has long since
been a reason to exclude real child pornography from the First
Amendment.239
The Second and Sixth Circuits have used concern for
emotional and reputational harm to children to show how morphed
child pornography raises similar concerns as real child
pornography, but declined to address Stevens in their decisions.240
230. Id.
231. Id. at 267.
232. Id. at 269.
233. Id. at 266.
234. Id. at 267.
235. Id. at 268.
236. Id. at 265 (referencing Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 at 471).
237. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265.
238. Id. It does seem that, in recent decisions, courts have used the
balancing test in addition to the amount of emotional and reputational harm
that children will be exposed to if they are involved in morphed child
pornography. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. Stevens was decided by the time the Sixth Circuit addressed the
question of whether morphed child pornography was a protected First
Amendment speech. Id. at 264. Yet, the Sixth Circuit chose not to address it at
all. Id. at 265. The Second Circuit, likewise, did not address Stevens. Id.
However, when the Second Circuit addressed morphed child pornography and
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The Fifth Circuit appeared to question whether the decision in
Stevens undercut the interest in preventing reputational and
emotional harm to children.241 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit
determined that Stevens did not carry enough weight to justify
overruling the Supreme Court’s longstanding precedent.242 From
Ferber through Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court had
placed great importance on the reputational and emotional harm
that morphed child pornography causes to the children involved.243
By concluding that the brief mention of child pornography in
Stevens did not carry enough weight to make such a significant
departure from the Supreme Court’s child pornography decisions,244
the Fifth Circuit highlighted that the one-paragraph mention of
child pornography in Stevens was insufficient to overrule the more
consistent trend towards an emphasis on emotional and
reputational harm that morphed child pornography can cause
children.245 In fact, Stevens so briefly mentioned child pornography
to the point where other courts have commented on its brevity.246
Further, the Fifth Circuit was persuaded by the rationale that
Stevens was used only to reject an analogy between child
pornography and depictions of animal cruelty.247
The Fifth Circuit relied on the notion that, if precedent of the
Court has direct application in a case, but looks like it rests on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case that directly controls.248 This applied
specifically here because Stevens made no mention of reputational
or emotional harm to children.249 This makes sense because Stevens
had nothing to do with child pornography;250 the interest in
protecting the emotional and reputational harm that child
pornography has on children could not be used to justify banning

its relationship to the First Amendment, Stevens had not been decided yet. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 267.
245. Id. at 265.
246. Id. (citing United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828, 838 (7th Cir. 2014)).
The Seventh Circuit noted that Stevens “had little to say about child
pornography at all; the case involved a . . . challenge to a federal statute aimed
at curbing the interstate market in ‘crush videos.’” Price, 775 F.3d 828 at 838.
For example, the Seventh Circuit noted that Stevens mentioned child
pornography “only in passing.” Id.
247. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266. The Fifth Circuit notes that the Seventh
Circuit made a good connection: that child pornography was mentioned in
Stevens “only in passing” and further, that it was used to reject an analogy
between it and depictions of animal cruelty. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 466.
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videos of animal torture.251 The Fifth Circuit noted that Stevens did
not even suggest that a connection to underlying criminal abuse
was the only aspect of Ferber’s rationale that mattered.252 On the
contrary, Stevens actually made clear that the connection to
underlying criminal abuse in Ferber makes it a special case.253 To
read Stevens as a First Amendment defense to all child pornography
prosecutions that do not include sexual crimes would limit the reach
of not only bans on morphed child pornography, but on real child
pornography.254
Decisions from Ferber through Free Speech Coalition have
consistently cited the need to protect children from the reputational
and emotional harm that could be caused if they were to fall victim
to child pornography.255
2. Limiting the First Amendment’s Categorical Exclusion of
Child Pornography to Just Images Depicting Underlying
Criminal Abuse of Children Would be Significant and
Detrimental
The Fifth Circuit noted that limiting the categorical exclusion
of child pornography to only images that depict an underlying
criminal act towards a child would be significant.256 This is because
the federal definition of real child pornography does not limit the
phrase “sexually explicit” to images depicting sexual abuse of a
minor.257 According to the federal definition, “sexually explicit”
includes the “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic
area” of a minor.258 To prosecute only images that depict sexual
abuse of a minor disregards the federal definition of “sexually
explicit” and, in fact, completely changes it.259 This is because the
federal definition of “sexually explicit” does not require that an
image depict actual abuse of a minor to meet the definition.260 To
change the definition to require that minors are sexually abused in
an image or video in order to meet the “sexually explicit” definition

251. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266.
252. Id. at 267 (citing Stevens 559 U.S. at 471).
253. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
254. Id. Relying heavily on the Stevens decision would be detrimental to real
child pornography. Id. at 266. There would be a strong possibility that it could
make prosecutions for real child pornography more difficult if it was found that
underlying sexual abuse was an essential element of the prosecution. Id.
255. Id. It has been the trend that, historically, courts rely heavily on a need
to protect children as a way to defeat First Amendment arguments regarding
child pornography. Id. at 263.
256. Id. at 266.
257. Id.
258. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v) (2018).
259. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
260. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v) (2018).
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would leave a whole slew of content unprotected that should be
protected.261 To change the federal definition to require that sexual
abuse be present seems to suggest that nude photographs of
children not engaged in sexual conduct, but nevertheless being
sexualized, would be acceptable.262
However, the Fifth Circuit has used this federal definition of
“sexually explicit” to affirm convictions.263 In Mecham, the court
referenced a 2017 Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Traweek,264 in
order to show that the federal definition of “sexually explicit” is used
to prosecute those who distribute or possess child pornography that
does not depict criminal sexual abuse of children.265 In Traweek, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction of a father who took images of
his nude step-daughters.266 The images were taken through a
hidden camera in the step-daughters’ bathroom and showed no
sexual or criminal acts.267 There, Traweek argued that Ferber
required that the images either depicted sexual abuse or depicted
the minor affirmatively committing a sexual act in order to
constitute child pornography.268 The court rejected this argument,
finding that the photos did depict “lascivious exhibitions of
genitalia,” therefore, constituting child pornography.269 The Fifth
Circuit noted that many state and federal courts have upheld
prosecutions involving images that zoom in on a minor’s genitals,
but do not depict sexual abuse.270 For example, the Fifth Circuit’s
2000 decision in United States v. Lyckman noted that “child
pornography may involve merely pictures of a naked child . . .
without physical sexual contact.”271 In fact, Ferber actually upheld
a New York law that banned “lewd exhibition of genitals” of

261. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267; see 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v) (2018) (for
example, every photograph or video that includes the “lascivious exhibition of
the anus, genitals, or pubic area.”).
262. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266.
263. Id.
266. United States v. Traweek, 707 F. App’x 213 (5th Cir. 2017).
265. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266. The Fifth Circuit explains their past
decisions that use the federal definition of “sexually explicit” as a way to show
that that same definition has been used previously to prosecute. Id.
266. Traweek, 707 F. App’x at 215. Homeland Security Investigations
received a tip that Troy Traweek was engaged in explicit email chats with an
agent who sent him nude photos of prepubescent females. Id. at 213.
267. Id. at 215. The photos showed a full-frontal nude image of one minor
and the buttocks of the other minor. Id. at 213. A search of Traweek’s home led
to the discovery of hidden cameras as well as other technology used in producing
child pornography. Id. at 214.
268. Id. The Fifth Circuit is using this to show that they have basically
already heard a similar argument about what the federal definition of “sexually
explicit” is and have rejected that argument. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 2000).
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minors.272
In sum, the Fifth Circuit has routinely held that child
pornography can only be prosecuted if it depicts underlying criminal
acts, which is a departure from the statutory language of previous
decisions.273
3. Depicting Identifiable Children Makes Morphed Child
Pornography Closer to “Real” Pornography
The fact that real and identifiable images of minors are being
used in morphed child pornography persuaded the Fifth Circuit to
hold that it does not deserve First Amendment protection.274 Using
images of identifiable children inevitably leads to emotional harm
when the child is made aware that their image is being used in such
a vile way.275 This makes morphed child pornography similar to
“real” child pornography in that it still creates substantial harm for
the child.276 Although the children whose faces are used in morphed
child pornography are not actually being harmed in the physical
sense (as they are in “real” child pornography), they still suffer
extreme damage from the aftermath of finding out that their image
was used.277 This can be extremely damaging to the child’s
psychological well-being and can have permanent effects on
countless other areas of their development and livelihoods.278 For
example, one of Mecham’s granddaughters explained the fear she

272. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765). The Fifth
Circuit notes that the application of child pornography laws to “lewd or
lascivious displays of a child’s genitals is not new.” Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266.
Time and time again, the aspect of the definition of “sexually explicit” has been
approved as permissible regulation. Id.
273. Id. If the Fifth Circuit had decided that the definition of “sexually
explicit” was meant to be construed as content that showed underlying sexual
abuse, it would be detrimental to previous and future decisions. Id. at 266.
274. Id. at 265.
275. Id. at 266. In Mecham’s case, he went out of his way to ensure that his
granddaughter received the images he created of her. Id. at 260. However, an
interesting counterargument lies in cases such as Nesmith where the victim
only found out about the image taken of her because of the investigation.
Nesmith, 866 F.3d at 678.
276. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266. Obviously, morphed child pornography is
dissimilar to real child pornography in that the children whose faces are used
in morphed child pornography are not actually experiencing the sexual acts,
they are simply made to look like they are adults engaged in sexual acts. Id. at
263.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 267. Would the children be better off having never been exposed
to the videos that they are in? Nesmith suggests, yes. Nesmith, 866 F.3d at 678.
There, the child could have lived her entire life not knowing that a pornographic
image of her existed; she was only made aware through investigations. Id. Once
she was made aware, she explained that she felt “humiliated and degraded.” Id.
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felt because of the photos.279 She had to attend counseling and still
struggles with friendships and relationships due to Mecham’s
actions.280 The fact that morphed child pornography can be
psychologically damning to children is recognized by every circuit
when considering the question – even the Eighth Circuit.281
However, although the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that morphed
child pornography was reputationally harmful to children, it was
persuaded by the Stevens rationale that the images must portray
underlying abuse.282
4. The Fifth Circuit Declined to Apply the Sentence
Enhancement
At his initial sentencing, the district court applied U.S.S.G. §
2G2.2(b)(4)(A) “for display of masochistic or sadistic conduct,” which
resulted in a four-point enhancement of Mecham’s sentence.283
Section 2G2.2(b)(4) applies “[i]f the offense involved material that
portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other pictures of
violence.”284 This meant that Mecham’s advisory guideline range
became ninety-seven to one hundred and twenty-one months rather
than sixty-three to seventy-eight months.285 Ultimately, the district
court sentenced him to the low end of the range (ninety-seven
months), but had the enhancement not been applied, a sentence of

279. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 26, United States v. Mecham, No. 1940319 (5th Cir. July 29, 2019). When Mecham posted videos on Facebook, his
granddaughter experienced lasting trauma. Id.
280. Id.
281. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267. In the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, it
acknowledged that morphed child pornography is definitely damaging to
children. Anderson, 759 F.3d at 896. However, the fact that there was no
underlying abuse persuaded the Eighth Circuit more than the amount of harm
that a child might experience. Id.
282. Anderson, 759 F.3d at 891; see Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267 (explaining
that the Eighth Circuit was persuaded by the Stevens rationale).
283. Mecham, 950 F.3d at, 267: Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 21, United
States v. Mecham, No. 18 CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019).
284. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2G2.2(b)(4)(A) (2018). § 2G2.2
of the Guidelines is titled, “Trafficking in Material Involving the Sexual
Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving, Transporting, Shipping, Soliciting, or
Advertising Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing
Material involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with Intent to Traffic;
Possessing Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor.” U.S.S.G.,
GUIDELINES MANUAL 214 (2018). If the defendant is convicted of 18 U.S.C. §§
1466A(b), 2252(a)(4), 2252A(a)(5), or 2252A(a)(7), their base offense level is 18.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.2(a)(1). Otherwise, the base offense level is
22. Id. at § 2G2.2(a)(2). This means that an offender with one or less criminal
history point(s) (the lowest criminal history category) has a minimum guideline
sentence of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment before departures. U.S.S.G.,
GUIDELINES MANUAL 407 (2018).
285. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
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ninety-seven months would likely have been an impermissible
departure.286
The government argued that the Fifth Circuit should uphold
Mecham’s sentence enhancement because it was harmless as the
district court would have applied the same ninety-seven month
sentence either way.287 The Fifth Circuit stated that the district
court erred in failing to consider Mecham’s argument based on
Nesmith.288 In Nesmith, the Fifth Circuit undertook an
interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(4), which led the court to
conclude that “[t]he plain text of [Section] 2G2.1(b)(4) weighs in
favor of an objective analysis.”289 The court explained that the
inquiry should thus “focus on an objective view of the image – what
is portrayed and depicted – rather than the viewpoint of either the
defendant or the victim.”290 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that
“an image portrays sadistic conduct where it depicts conduct that
an objective observer would perceive as causing the victim in the
image physical or emotional pain contemporaneously with the
image’s creation.”291 The Nesmith ruling meant that “postcreation
emotional harm to Mecham’s granddaughters [did] not warrant the
[sentence] enhancement” because first, Mecham’s images did not
portray physical pain, and, second, the government failed to meet
its burden.292
First, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that Mecham’s images did
not depict the subjects in pain; the only pain that the images have
caused his granddaughters is the post-creation emotional harm.293
However, an image can still be deemed sadistic if it shows the
subjects in physical pain.294 Considering that morphed child
pornography involves the obvious use of an adult body, intercourse
alone does not involve the requisite pain.295 The Fifth Circuit noted
286. Id. The District Court’s presentence report stated that “numerous
morphed images and videos” among the thousands that Mecham had created
were qualified for a sentence enhancement. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Nesmith, 866 F.3d at 679.
290. Id. at 679-80. The court noted that the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits had already agreed that “whether the sadism
enhancement applies is an objective inquiry.” Id. at 680.
291. Id. at 681.
292. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. In explaining that, “for morphed pornography involving the obvious
use of an adult body, intercourse alone does not involve the requisite pain,” the
court offered examples of what kinds of morphed child pornography could
qualify for the sado-masochistic enhancement, including: when the body image
is of a “prepubescent child, just not the one whose face is shown,” Id. at 268
(citing Bach, 400 F.3d at 632); when the body image is showing “conduct that is
painful or cruel even for an adult,” such as being forcibly restrained, Mecham,
950 F.3d at 268 (citing Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 731–32); or when the body image
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that not all morphed child pornography is disqualified from a
sadistic sentence enhancement.296 However, a pornographic image
that is morphed with children’s faces over adult bodies engaging in
non-painful intercourse is disqualified.297 Because the district court
did not make a finding that Mecham’s images showed the adult
bodies engaging in painful intercourse, the Fifth Circuit found that
it was an error to include the sentence enhancement.298 The court
reasoned that the images Mecham had created showed adult bodies
engaging in normal intercourse and found that they were not
deserving of a sentence enhancement even though the faces of real
children, specifically his granddaughters, were used.299 It may be a
gut reaction to assume that a sentence enhancement should be
applied simply because a grandfather could create such sickening
content about his granddaughters.300 However, because the sex
between the adults in the images was not in itself painful or violent,
the court found that a sentence enhancement was not applicable.301
Second, the government was unable to show that the error in
applying the four-point enhancement was harmless.302 To
demonstrate that a sentencing error was harmless, the government
was required to show that (1) “the district court would have imposed
the same sentence had it not made the error,” and (2) “it would have
done so for the same reasons it gave at the prior sentencing.”303 In
Mecham, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that the most
straightforward way for the government to prove harmlessness
would have been if the district court had explicitly stated at
sentencing that it would have applied the same ninety-seven-month
sentence without enhancement.304 Here, the district court made no
such mention.305 The Fifth Circuit rejected the government’s
reliance on the court’s consideration of the statutory sentencing
considerations in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).306 During the district court’s
sentencing hearing, the government did address 18 U.S.C. §
reasonably appears to be “of a prepubescent child (even though it is not) for
whom the sex act would be painful.” Mecham, 950 F3d. at 268 (citing Nesmith,
866 F.3d at 680).
296. Id. at 268.
297. Id. at 267.
298. Id. at 268.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 267.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 268 (quoting United States v. Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d 712, 714 (5th
Cir. 2010)).
304. Mecham, 950 F3d. at 268. The government argued that the Fifth
Circuit need not even discuss the sentence enhancement at all. Id. The
government thus contended that, no matter what, the District Court would have
given Mecham a ninety-seven-month sentence. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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3553(a).307 However, the district court did not specifically address
the government’s § 3553(a) reliance.308 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
held this reliance to be “unexceptional.”309 The Fifth Circuit stated
that the court should have considered the sentencing factors when
determining the sentence.310 A court’s mere consideration of the
Section 3553(a) factors is an even weaker basis for finding
harmlessness when the court imposes a sentence at the low end of
the guidelines.311

C. The Impact of Mecham
The silver lining in Mecham’s actions is that, ultimately, the
Fifth Circuit’s decision will better protect children.312 The legal
effects of the Fifth Circuit’s decision regarding the constitutionality
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(C) are that more creators
of morphed child pornography will be prosecuted.313 Hopefully, this
will disincentivize the creation of morphed child pornography thus
saving many children from emotional scarring.314 On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit’s upholding of the Nesmith standard could
have detrimental effects on the prosecution’s ability to enhance
sentences for extremely vulgar content simply because the victim
was not harmed simultaneously with the creation.315

IV. PERSONAL ANALYSIS
The fight to prevent online predators from harming children
has been an uphill battle, and the battle is still ongoing.316 In the
age of the Internet, where unlimited information is accessible
constantly and in an instant, it is nearly impossible to cover every
base. At one time, it would have been hard to imagine that the
Internet would evolve in such a way that would allow people to
307. Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 36, United States v. Mecham, No. 18
CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019).
308. Id.
309. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 268. There was no information that led the Fifth
Circuit to believe that the district court would have given Mecham a ninetyseven-month sentence had they actually considered Mecham’s arguments
regarding the sentence enhancement. Id. The easiest way to show that the
district court would have applied a ninety-seven-month sentence anyways
would be if it explicitly stated that it would have regardless of Mecham’s
arguments. Id. However, the district court did not even consider Mecham’s
arguments. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 260.
313. Id. at 268.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See supra Part II.
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easily create dangerous content such as morphed child
pornography. But, one thing is obvious, morphed child pornography
is a real danger that has the ability to devastate real children and
their families’ lives. Yet, there is a disconnect amongst the circuits
regarding the constitutionality of morphed child pornography.317 As
the Internet will likely become an even more powerful tool for
creating dangerous content, it is immensely important that circuits
become unified in the treatment of dangerous content that we do
know exists.
Although freedom of speech is a fair argument and concern,
the concern about children’s wellbeing should be and has been in
the past, much greater.318 As the Fifth Circuit noted, concern for the
emotional and reputational harm to children has long been a valid
reason for the categorical exclusion of child pornography.319 This
issue can be tackled in three ways: (1) courts must differentiate
morphed and virtual child pornography,320 (2) Congress should
amend the definition of “child pornography” in 18 U.S.C. § 2256 to
include specific language regarding morphed child pornography,321
and (3) the Supreme Court needs to clarify their discussion of Ferber
in Stevens in order to end the prolonged and increasingly dangerous
prevalence of morphed child pornography.322

A. Distinguishing Morphed and Virtual Child
Pornography
In considering the constitutionality of the CPPA in Free Speech
Coalition, the Supreme Court stated that morphed child
pornography may fall within the definition of virtual child
pornography.323 Currently, morphed child pornography is
(arguably) addressed in Section 2256(8)(C) of 18 U.S.C.324 The
section states as follows:
(8) “child pornography” means any visual depiction, including any
photography, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated
317. See Stevens, 559 U.S. 460; Mecham, 950 F3d. 267.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 266.
320. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240.
321. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2021). As currently on the books, “child
pornography” does not use “morphed child pornography” explicitly. Id. Rather,
it includes language such as “whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means.” Id. This ambiguous language leaves room for
interpretation. Id.
322. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 461. The brief mention of child pornography in this
case has spiraled into confusion amongst the circuits as evidenced by the Eighth
Circuit being heavily persuaded in their decision by this rationale. Anderson,
759 F.3d at 895.
323. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
324. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2021).
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image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where …
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to
appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.325

In Free Speech Coalition, the Court explained that Section
2256(8)(C) embodies the “more common and lower tech” means of
creating virtual images.326 However, the Court declined to consider
the constitutionality of morphed child pornography because only 18
U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(B) and (D) were challenged under the CPPA.327
Section 2256(8)(B) prohibited “any visual depiction . . . that is or
appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”328
Section 2256(8)(D) banned depictions of sexually explicit acts that
are “advertised . . . in such a manner that conveys the impression
that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”329
It is easy to equate morphed child pornography to virtual child
pornography; both rely on computer generation to exploit
children.330 However, there is certainly a blurred line between
virtual child pornography and morphed child pornography in that
neither physically harms real children. Although the Supreme
Court chose not to analyze or distinguish morphed child
pornography from virtual child pornography, the two are vastly
different and must be treated as such. Morphed child pornography
and virtual child pornography are different for two main reasons:
(1) morphed child pornography uses the images of real identifiable
children, thus punishing the creation is punishing more than a
mere thought; and (2) The harm to real children greatly outweighs
the literary value of morphed child pornography.
1. The Creation of Morphed Child Pornography Goes
Beyond Simply Thinking of Acting Illegally
In Free Speech Coalition, the government argued that virtual
child pornography “whets the appetite” of pedophiles by
encouraging them to engage in illegalities.331 The Supreme Court
stressed that just because speech has the tendency to encourage

325. Id.
326. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. Sections 2256(8)(B) and (D) under the CPPA are unconstitutional
because the language is too broad. Id. at 258. The sections banned sexually
explicit content that simply appeared to include a minor, even if it was adults
made to look like children. Id.
330. Id. at 241.
331. Id. at 253.
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unlawful acts does not mean that the government can prohibit it.332
The purpose of the First Amendment is to protect people’s thoughts,
as “[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must
be protected from the government because speech is the beginning
of thought.”333
First Amendment cases typically distinguish words and
deeds.334 Those who create virtual child pornography act only
insofar as they create fully computer generated content that depicts
children engaging in sexually explicit acts.335 For this reason, the
Court concluded that the provisions in the CPPA that made virtual
pornography illegal were unconstitutional.336 It explained, “[t]he
Government has shown no more than a remote connection between
speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any
resulting child abuse.”337
Morphed child pornography undoubtedly presents more than a
“remote connection” between speech that might encourage thoughts
and result in child abuse. Because those who create morphed child
pornography use real, identifiable children in their content, albeit
the images, morphed child pornography goes one step further than
virtual child pornography. As evidenced by Mecham, morphed child
pornography causes harm for the children who are included in the
images. Although morphed child pornography does not depict an
underlying physical abuse, it does create emotional child abuse. In
Ferber, the Court concluded that the speech itself was a record of
child abuse, and therefore, may be prohibited.338 Similarly,
morphed child pornography itself is a record of emotional abuse
significant enough that it warrants prohibition.
2. Is There Literary Value in Virtual or Morphed Child
Pornography?
In Free Speech Coalition, the government argued that child
pornography was without any literary value at all.339 The Court
found that argument unpersuasive, however, on the grounds that
there are recognized works of child pornography that might have
significant value.340 Ferber explained that virtual child
pornography could hold literary value because, under some set of
332. Id.; see Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566 (asserting that “[t]he government
cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a
person’s private thoughts”).
333. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 253.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
339. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 250.
340. Id. at 251.
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facts, its importance could outweigh its harm.341 When an adult
made to look like a child is playing the role of a minor in a TV show,
movie, book, or art, there could be literary value in sexual relations,
and, of course, no real child is harmed.342
The same simply cannot be true for morphed child
pornography, as one would be hard-pressed to think of a scenario in
which the face of a child superimposed over adult bodies having sex
would hold any literary value. Especially because of the risk of harm
to the children involved, morphed child pornography will likely
never be found to possess any literary value. The importance of the
content cannot ever outweigh the harm to a child in morphed child
pornography. This is because the child is a real human being with
thoughts, feelings, and emotions. The “children” in virtual child
pornography are either adults made to look like children or entirely
animated, thus, harm is not always guaranteed; it is not directed
specifically at one real child. Morphed child pornography is
dissimilar to virtual pornography in this way.343 If virtual child
pornography is created using animation, there is simply no one that
has been harmed because no aspect of the content is “real.”344
Morphed child pornography does have a “real” aspect; the faces of
the children being used.345 Morphed child pornography, unlike
virtual child pornography that contains no actual children, “creates
. . . victims by its production” and is justifiably prohibited.346
Although morphed child pornography is obviously not identical
to real child pornography, it should not be equated with virtual
child pornography either. Real children are involved. Real harm can
be caused. As the Court said in Free Speech Coalition, morphed
child pornography “implicate[s] the interests of real children and
[is] in that sense closer to the images in Ferber.”347

B. MCP Should be Separately Defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256
Contained within 18 U.S.C. § 2256 are the important
definitions for Chapter 110, titled Sexual Exploitation and Other
Abuse of Children.348 Section 2256(8) defines child pornography.349
Morphed child pornography is included in this definition, but
341. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
342. Id.
343. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242. The Court noted that there are
differences between virtual child pornography and morphed child pornography.
Id.
344. Id. at 252.
345. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 264.
346. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 26, United States v. Mecham, No. 1940319 (5th Cir. July 29, 2019) (citing Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 250.).
347. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
348. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2021).
349. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2021).
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ambiguously.350 Section 2256(8)(C) prohibits “. . . visual depiction[s]
[that have] been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”351 The
language of this section should be rewritten to completely outline
that content depicting the faces of children superimposed onto the
bodies of adults engaging in sexually explicit conduct is prohibited.
Of course, creating a definition of morphed child pornography
that passes constitutional muster may prove to be a challenge if it
is not worded exactly right. As evidenced in Free Speech Coalition,
attempts to prohibit virtual child pornography in the past have
flopped.352 The Supreme Court has found the language of the CPPA
far too broad and restrictive.353 In officially defining morphed child
pornography, legislators must ensure it is narrower than “created,
adapted, or modified.”354
The Internet is a complex beast, and defining components of it
should be no simple task. There needs to be language that
specifically defines what morphed child pornography is in order to
eliminate ambiguity regarding what conduct is prohibited and what
is not. The best way to eliminate ambiguity is to create a separate
subsection under Section 2256(8) that explicitly defines morphed
child pornography. After all, the technology to create different types
of child pornography is only going to increase as the capacity of the
Internet does. Accurately defining known Internet dangers would
be the easiest way to prepare for those that are yet to come.

C. There Needs to be Clarification Regarding the Supreme
Court’s Mention of Child Pornography in Stevens
The Supreme Court’s mention of child pornography in Stevens
caused, and still is causing, a significant amount of confusion
amongst the circuits. In fact, the Fifth Circuit spent much of its
Mecham opinion analyzing how Stevens has influenced other
decisions about morphed child pornography, including the Eighth
Circuit.355 The limited mention of child pornography in Stevens
states as follows:
In Ferber, for example, we classified child pornography as [a category
of speech fully outside the protection of the First Amendment] . . . We
made clear that Ferber presented a special case: The market for child
pornography was “intrinsically related” to the underlying abuse and
was therefore “an integral part of the production of such materials,
350. Id.
351. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2021) (explaining that the language of “created,
adapted, or modified” could be much clearer).
352. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
353. Id. at 257.
354. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2021).
355. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 264.
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an activity illegal throughout the Nation.356

In Stevens, the Supreme Court explained that its decision in
Ferber did not simply rest on a “balance of competing interests”
alone.357 Rather, the decision rested on the fact that child
pornography goes hand in hand with underlying abuse.358 The
Eighth Circuit seemingly read this to mean that only content
showing underlying abuse will be categorically excluded from the
First Amendment, and thus morphed child pornography is
protected.359 Interestingly, the facts presented in Stevens had
nothing to do with child pornography. As such, Stevens cannot
continue to hold so much weight.
As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, child pornography was dicta
in Stevens and was used to reject an analogy between it and
depictions of animal cruelty.360 The Eighth Circuit evidently
misconstrued one thing about Stevens: it failed to mention the
importance of protecting children from emotional and reputational
harm.361 For this reason, its application to cases involving child
pornography is flawed. Most major cases that analyze child
pornography consider reputational and emotional harm suffered by
children.362
Stevens’s suggestion that child pornography must depict an
underlying criminal act in order to be excluded from the First
Amendment fails to consider harm to children. If this were true,
morphed child pornography would be protected by the First
Amendment as free speech. The problem with this is that, although
morphed child pornography does not inflict physical harm onto
children, it does harm them in other ways. And the ways in which
morphed child pornography harms children are more tangible than
the government’s arguments in Free Speech Coalition.363

D. The Fifth Circuit Erred in Declining to Apply the FourPoint Sadism Sentence Enhancement
The government correctly argued in Mecham that the sentence
enhancement should apply and that overruling the objection to it

356. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759, 761, 763).
357. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
358. Id. In Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court further shed some
light on what it meant in Ferber. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 251. Ferber’s
judgment, explained the Supreme Court, was based upon how child
pornography was made, not on what it communicated. Id.
359. Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
360. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266.
361. Id.
362. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747; Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 234; Mecham,
950 F.3d at 257.
363. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
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was consistent even with Nesmith.364 The video that Mecham
created showed his five-year-old granddaughter “being penetrated
vaginally, anally, and orally by multiple male adults.”365 Further,
Mecham chose, strategically no doubt, to superimpose his
granddaughter’s face onto a woman’s body that looked extremely
young.366 Because of this, an objective viewer would perceive that
the victim in the video was in pain.367 Mecham’s efforts to create a
morphed pornographic video using a female’s body that appeared
young were calculated, manipulative, and malicious. It can be seen
as an attempt to create content that most closely resembled child
pornography and that should not be ignored.

V. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court explained in Free Speech Coalition,
morphed child pornography is a “more common and lower tech
means of creating virtual images.”368 But morphed child
pornography is not an innocent means of creating child
pornography – there is no such thing. Instead, morphed child
pornography uses the images of real, identifiable minors and has
the ability to create serious reputational and emotional harm.369
The disconnect between circuits regarding how to treat morphed
child pornography is detrimental to the children involved.370
To help remedy this problem, three courses of action should be
taken. First, morphed child pornography needs to be clearly
distinguished from virtual child pornography. Second, 18 U.S.C. §
2256 needs to include explicit language defining morphed child
pornography.371 A separate subsection devoted entirely to morphed
child pornography would be beneficial in clearing up the ambiguity.
364. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 44, United States v. Mecham, No. 1940319 (5th Cir. July 29, 2019).
365. Id. at 45.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 26.
368. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
369. Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266. During the district court’s sentencing
hearing, the government explained “[t]he descriptions by the victim, one of his
victims . . . talking about her level of discomfort when the defendant was in her
home.” Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 23, United States v. Mecham, No. 18
CR 1339 (S.D. Tex. May 17, 2019). This delves a little bit into how Mecham’s
actions impacted his granddaughters. Id. Further, Mecham exposed his
granddaughter to this content by sending her the videos. Id. Clearly, emotional
harm must follow from being sent a video of one’s own face superimposed over
the bodies of adults engaging in sexual relations.
370. See Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 895 (explaining that, unless it can be found
that images such as those that Mecham created have been historically
unprotected, they are distinguished enough from a morphed image depicting
actual sexual abuse to be considered protected free speech.).
371. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2021).
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Finally, the Supreme Court needs to clarify their mention of child
pornography in Stevens.372
Ultimately, “there is no place for child pornography[,] even
in our free society,”373 and this sentiment necessarily must include
the epidemic that is morphed child pornography.

372. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
373. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 26.
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